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Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-MAGNETOMETER AS SzARc-Ep-
person v. United States, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
As a result of the great number of airborne hijackings and in an attempt
to prevent them, the United States Government has developed a "system
for discouraging and apprehending potential hijackers" 1 that includes the
use of a metal detecting device known as a magnetometer. The constitu-
tional validity of the use of this device recently has been questioned in
regard to the fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures in the case of Epperson v. United States.
2
When defendant Epperson was attempting to board an interstate com-
mercial flight, a magnetometer to which all passengers on the flight were
exposed indicated that he was carrying a large amount of metal. After re-
moval of several items from his pockets, the device continued to indicate
a significant amount of metal on his person. A United States Marshal then
searched Epperson's jacket and found a loaded .22 caliber pistol. Epperson
was subsequently convicted of violating a federal statute3 that prohibits the
1See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082-1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), for a dis-
cussion of the anti-hijacking system. The elements discussed in the opinion are:
(1) Heavy penalties. As passed by Congress, the death penalty was provided. This
has been superseded, however, by a recent Supreme Court decision that held the death
penalty unconstitutional.
(2) Notice to the public. Signs are posted at boarding gates, warning of the statutory
penalty and asserting that persons and baggage are subject to search.
(3) Profile. A set of twenty-five to thirty characteristics based on known hijackers
has been compiled to form a method of visual identification of persons who may be
contemplating air piracy.
(4) Magnetometer. This device measures the distortion of magnetic lines of flux
created by passage of a certain quantity of ferrous metal through the measuring area.
The model employed in Lopez consists of two poles with a series of the measuring
devices attached thereto. Passengers walk between the poles; if they carry enough
ferrous metal to equal the flux distortion of a predetermined mass (generally equivalent
to a .25 caliber pistol), a warning light flashes.
(5) Interview by airlines personnel. One who activates the magnetometer is inter-
viewed by airlines employees who make a preliminary determination of whether the
person should be detained for questioning by a United States Marshal.
(6) Interview by Marshal. The Marshal attempts to determine whether the device
has been set off by harmless objects by questioning the detainee, and asking him to dis-
play any metal he may be carrying. If the explanation is not satisfactory and the mag-
netometer remains activated, the detainee then is asked to submit to a search.
(7) Frisk. If a pat-down of exterior clothing to locate weapons produces no weapons,
the detainee is allowed to board. If the result is otherwise, the person is detained for
further investigation and the possible filing of charges.
2 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).




carrying of concealed dangerous weapons on board an aircraft engaged in
interstate commerce. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed, finding no fourth amendment violation.
Having decided initially that use of the magnetometer was per se a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the court determined that this
factual situation fell within the warrant exception delineated in Terry v.
Ohio.4 The court did acknowledge a difference in the two situations, but
noted that Epperson hinged on the Terry test of "whether a reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger." 5 The Circuit Court continued,
saying "[t] he danger is so well known, the governmental interest so over-
whelming, and the invasion of privacy so minimal, that the warrant require-
ment is excused by exigent national circumstances." 6 Citing previous cases
that have emphasized the importance of reasonableness in a warrantless
search,7 the court related the extensive tragedy involved in hijackings and
[W]hoever, while aboard an aircraft being operated by an air carrier in air
transportation, has on or about his person a concealed deadly or dangerous wea-
pon, or whoever attempts to board such an aircraft while having on or about
his person a concealed deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
The penalty in this section does not conflict with note 1 supra, as acts of aircraft
piracy and interference with flight crew members or flight attendants carry much stiffer
penalties. Id., (i) (j).
-1392 U.S. 1 (1968). A policeman observed Terry and one other man pacing back
and forth along a street, occasionally staring into the window of a particular store. An-
other man joined the two, and the policeman followed them, suspecting that they were
planning a holdup. The officer then approached the trio, frisked Terry, and discovered
a pistol, after which a frisk of the original companion produced a revolver. Both were
charged with and convicted of carrying concealed weapons. The Supreme Court af-
firmed the conviction, holding that a warrant was not necessary as a prerequisite to the
search.
The Terry exception to the warrant requirement states that a reasonably prudent of-
ficer, warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others is endangered, may search
a suspect for weapons, even though the officer has no search warrant and no probable
cause for arrest. Id. at 20-27. However, this is not a blanket endorsement for any and
all frisks by a policeman. Terry noted that "in justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21.
The Court reinforced this idea, saying "Itihis demand for specificity in the information
upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 21 n. 18.
G 392 U.S. 1, at 27.
O Epperson v. United States, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972).
7 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
539 (1967); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 .(1960).
In Elkins, state law enforcement officers obtained a warrant to seize obscene pictures
and accompanying sound recordings. The search revealed neither but rather equipment
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concluded that the frisk of Epperson following the magnetometer search
"was entirely justifiable and reasonable under Terry." 8
In drawing such a close parallel to Terry, the court evidently felt that
the different circumstances in the instant case did not materially alter the
legal consequences that prevailed in the former case. However, the differ-
ence is substantial. In Terry, even though "[t]here was no warrant, no
probable cause for arrest, no probable cause for search for evidence of
crime" " prior to the search, there were suspicious circumstances sufficient
to "'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken
was appropriate." 10 However, in Epperson not only was there a lack of
the same three elements noted in Terry, but also the United States Marshal
had not the least suspicion prior to the electronic search. Thus, without any
thought whatsoever that anything might be awry, Epperson was "searched"
by the magnetometer as were all other passengers on the flight.
Here the parallel drawn with Terry breaks down, for what the court did
in effect was to authorize a general body search of all persons boarding
commercial flights without requiring the use of a personality profile, in-
formants' tips, or suspicious circumstances. The fear for the safety of the
officers or of others existed prior to the search in Terry, and after the search
in Epperson. According to Terry, to determine that a search is reasonable,
the officer's action must be "justified at its inception, and . . . reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place." 11
The court apparently considered these two categories of determination
as the standard, but in applying them to the instant situation failed to ex-
plain the decision in the practice required in a search and seizure case in
which no warrant has been issued. In one sentence, the court disposed of
the "justified at its inception" portion of the Terry standard,12 stating that
the inconvenience is slight, and the search not for evidence of prior crim-
inal conduct. One questions whether this conclusion satisfies the Terry test.
believed to have been used in wiretapping. The state court allowed the evidence, hold-
ing the exclusionary rule not applicable because no federal action was involved. The
Supreme Court ruled that the federal standard is applicable to the states.
Camara had refused to allow a warrantless inspection of his apartment by municipal
health officers who had reason to believe his use of the premises was violating the city
housing code. He sought a writ of prohibition when the city brought criminal charges
against him for violating the ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the evidence ob-
tained in the warrantless search was not admissible, and required warrants for such
administrative searches.
s Epperson v. United States, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1972).
9 Id. at 770.
'o Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
11 Id. at 20.
12 Epperson v. United States, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972).
RECENT DECISIONS
A better basis to obtain the same result would seem to lie along the, lines
of Camara v. United States, which held "that a limited search in certain
circumstances can be justified on less than probable cause .... ," 13 Terry
exemplifies that case in which a warrantless search is allowed based on less
than probable cause, but its application is not broad enough to encompass
the instant situation. Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has said
that a search warrant cannot be excused "without a showing by those who
seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the
situation made that course imperative." 14 Therefore, under this and other
rulings of the Supreme Court, the lower courts must find that a warrantless
search falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant require-
ment,16 or must create a new exception,16 or must otherwise find the situa-
tion to be reasonable.
A more recent case, United States v. Schafer,17 has achieved the same
13 This does not *mean, however, that a warrant is not necessary. "In fact, the Court
has insisted that while a limited search may be justified on less than probable cause,'ihis
less-demanding standard must still be implemented by a neutral magistrate, unless one
of the well-established exceptions apply. . . " United States v. Brewer, 343 F. Supp. 468,
475 (D. Hawaii 1972).
14 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). Without a search warrant
police officers gained access through the window of defendant's landlady's apartment,
and from there observed illegal lottery operations. The officers then seized the number
slips and other evidence. The Supreme Court reversed a conviction, holding the evi-
dence was obtained by illegal search and seizure.
It See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to and contem-
poraneous with a lawful arrest); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (search of
a vehicle based on probable cause); Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1 (1968) (search for weapons
when a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in believing that his safety or that of
others is endangered); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (search where article
is left in plain view); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (search in hot pursuit
of a fleeing felony suspect); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (search incident to
custodial prerogative); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (search of abandoned
property); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) (searches knowingly and volun-
tarily consented to); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 1004 (1964) (search under urgent necessity, such as loud screams from inside
a building, or to prevent destruction of the thing to be seized); Annot, 6 AL.R. FED.
317, at § 3 (1971). For a further discussion of these exceptions see Wheeler v. Good-
man, 330 F. Supp. 1356, 1361-62 (W.D.N.C. 1971,); Annot, 5 AM. JuR. TiAlS 331,
5§ 5, etseq. (1966).
See additional discussion of Terry exception at note 4 supra.
6',In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exceptionto the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the pub-
lic interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority to search
should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the
,burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,-533 (1966). ; 1
17461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1972). A routine search was made of Schafer's baggage (dll
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result as Epperson by following the Supreme Court guidelines,"' and ap-
parently that same reasoning could have been employed in Epperson. The
necessary time delay in obtaining warrants for magnetometer searches of
all passengers would frustrate the reason for these inspections, allowing po-
tential hijackers the opportunity to take over an aircraft before warrants
could issue.
The Fourth Circuit passed over the solution to the problem of search
without requiring even mere suspicion, much less probable cause. The
Schafer case tackled the issue by offering a credible solution in terms of
established fourth amendment precedent. Although Schafer involved bag-
bage, and Epperson concerned only the person of the defendant, there
appears to be no reason why the same argument would not be equally valid
for Epperson. In conclusion, although the Epperson court has reached an
obviously necessary result, it appears that there is existing established fourth
amendment law under which the problem of warrantless search could have
been solved.
S. H. M.
luggage was searched indiscriminately) to determine if it contained any article or plant
pests prohibited by an agricultural quarantine. The inspecting officer discovered mari-
juana in defendant's bag, and upon a closer investigation found LSD tablets. The court
held the substances admissible in a criminal prosecution.
Is The Ninth Circuit noted that "a search warrant requirement would 'frustrate' the
purpose of these inspections, because of the time delays inherent in the search warrant
mechanism. Unless all departing passengers could be detained while warrants... could
issue.. . " Id. at 858. This follows Camara, note 15 supra. The Schafer Court also dis-
cussed the issue of probable cause, finding that no means other than a full search of all
baggage "would achieve acceptable results." Because the search was not arbitrary or
selective, and since the main purpose was not to "[eiffect a further deprivation of life,
liberty or property ... the necessity for these baggage searches at the Honolulu air-
port satisfies the 'probable cause' requirements of Camara." Id. at 859.
